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Abstract. A new graph-based approach to edit distance cryptanalysis
of some clock-controlled generators is here presented in order to simplify
search trees of the original attacks. In particular, the proposed improve-
ment is based on cut sets defined on some graphs so that only the most
promising branches of the search tree have to be analyzed because cer-
tain shortest paths provide the edit distances. The strongest aspects of
the proposal are: a) the obtained results from the attack are absolutely
deterministic and b) many inconsistent initial states are recognized be-
forehand and avoided during search.
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1 Introduction
The main goal in the design of stream ciphers is to generate long pseudorandom
keystream sequences from a short key in such a way that it is not possible to
rebuild the short key from the keystream sequence. This work focuses on stream
ciphers based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), and more precisely
on Shrinking [2] and Alternating Step [10] generators. Both generators produce
keystream sequences with good cryptographic properties [8].
Most types of cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known
plaintext hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct
access to the keystream output from the generator [11]. The computational com-
plexity of such attacks is always compared with the complexity of the exhaustive
search, and if the former is smaller, then the cipher is said to be broken. Although
this theoretical definition can look useless, in fact it is very important for the
development and understanding of the security of stream ciphers because many
times it reveals weaknesses that might lead to practical attacks.
The main idea behind this paper is to propose a deterministic improvement of
a known plaintext divide-and-conquer attack consisting of three steps: 1) Guess
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the initial state of an LFSR component of the generator. 2) Try to determine
the other variables of the cipher based on the intercepted keystream. 3) Check
that guess was consistent with observed keystream sequence.
This three-step attack was first proposed in [6] and [7] by means of a distance
function known as Levenshtein or edit distance. Nevertheless, the approach con-
sidered in this work may be seen as an extension of the constrained edit distance
attack to clock-controlled LFSR-based generators presented in [12] and gener-
alized in [1]. Our main aim here is to investigate whether the number of initial
states to be analyzed can be reduced. This feature was pointed out in [4] as one
of the most interesting problems in the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. Accord-
ing to the original method, the attacker needs to traverse an entire search tree
including all the possible LFSR initial states. However, in this work the original
attack is improved by simplifying the search tree in such a way that only the
most efficient branches are retained. In order to achieve such a goal, cut sets
are defined in certain graphs that are here used to model the original attack.
This new approach produces a significant improvement in the computing time
of the original edit distance attack since it implies a dramatic reduction in the
number of initial states that need to be evaluated. Furthermore, it is remarkable
that, unlike previous attacks, the results obtained from this proposal are fully
deterministic.
2 Preliminaries
The Shrinking Generator (SG) [2] and the Alternating Step Generator (ASG)
[10] are two well known keystream generators with cryptographic applications.
The notation used within this work is as follows. The lengths of the LFSRs
S, A and B are denoted respectively by LS , LA and LB . Their characteristic
polynomials are respectively PS(x), PA(x) and PB(x), and the sequences they
produce are denoted by {si}, {ai} and {bi}. The output keystream is {zj}.
Despite their simplicity and the large number of published attacks [3], [5], [9]
and [13], both generators remain remarkably resistant to practical cryptanalysis
and the previous references are just theoretical attacks.
The edit or Levenshtein distance is the minimum number of elementary op-
erations (insertions, deletions and substitutions) required to transform one se-
quenceX of length N into another sequence Y of lengthM , whereM ≤ N . Some
applications of the edit distance are file checking, spell correction, plagiarism de-
tection, molecular biology and speech recognition. The dynamic programming
approach (like the shortest-distance graph search and Viterbi algorithm) is a
classical solution for computing the edit distance matrix where the distances
between prefixes of the sequences are successively evaluated until the final result
is achieved. When applying an edit distance attack on a clock-controlled stream
cipher, the objective is to compute the initial state of a target LFSR that is
a component of the attacked generator. As in Viterbi search, this problem has
the property that the shortest path to a state is always part of any solution of
which such a state is a part. We will be able to see this fact quite clearly by the
formalization of the algorithm as a search through a graph.
Clock-controlled registers are said to work with constrained clocking when
a restriction exists on a maximum number of times that the register may be
clocked before an output bit is produced. For these registers, attacks based on
the so-called constrained edit distance have been proposed and analyzed in [6]
and [7].
In this work, two different possible models for the attacked generator are
considered. In both cases it is assumed that the feedback polynomial of the target
LFSR is known. According to the first model, it is assumed that Y = {yn} is an
intercepted keystream segment of length M , which is seen as a noisy decimated
version of a segment X = {xn} of length N produced by a target LFSR. On
the other hand, according to the second model, it is assumed that X = {xn} is
an intercepted keystream segment of length N , which is seen as a noisy widened
version of a segment Y = {yn} of length M produced by a target LFSR. In this
latter case, insertions in the sequence Y are indicated by two sequences S and
B so that S points the locations where the bits of B must be inserted.
The main objective of the attack according to these models will be to deduce
some initial state of the target LFSR that allows one to produce an intercepted
keystream sequence through decimation or insertion, respectively, without know-
ing the decimation or insertion sequences.
An essential step in edit distance attacks is the computation of edit distance
matrices W = (wi,j), i = 0, 1, . . . , N −M, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M associated each one
with a couple of sequences X and Y where Y is the intercepted keystream
sequence and X is a LFSR sequence produced by one possible initial state.
In the first model, the intercepted sequence is Y while X is the candidate
sequence. In the second model, the intercepted sequence is X while Y is the
candidate sequence. Also note that from the computation of the edit distance
between X and Y , the edit sequences that are computed in the first case cor-
respond to decimation sequences while in the second case they correspond to
insertion sequences.
Some of the parameters of such a matrix are described below. Firstly, its
dimension is (N−M+1)·M . Furthermore, its last column gives the edit distance
between X and Y thanks to the value mini=0,...,N−M{wi,M+N−M−i}. Lastly,
each element of the matrix, apart from the last column wi,j , i = 0, . . . , N −
M, j = 1, . . . ,M−1, corresponds exactly to the edit distance between prefix sub-
sequences x1, x2, . . . , xi+j and y1, y2, . . . , yj . The edit distance between prefix
sub-sequences x1, x2, . . . , xi+M and Y are given by wi,M + N − M − i, i =
0, . . . , N −M .
In the edit distance attack here analyzed only deletions and substitutions are
allowed. Consequently, each element wi,j of the edit distance matrix W may be
recursively computed from the elements of the previous columns according to
the formulas in Equation (1), which depend exclusively on the coincidence or
difference between the two bits xi+j and yj .
wi,1 = Pi(xi+1, y1), i = 0, . . . , N −M
w0,j = w0,j−1 + P0(xj , yj), j = 2, . . . ,M
wi,j = mink=0,...,i{wi−k,j−1 + Pk(xi+j , yj)}, i = 1, . . . , N −M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+j , yj) =
{
k if xi+j = yj
k + 1 if xi+j 6= yj , k = 0, ..., i
(1)
Pk(xi+j , yj) gives the cost of the deletion of k bits previous to xi+j plus its
substitution by its complementary if xi+j 6= yj . Note that a maximum length k
of possible runs of decimations is assumed for constrained edit distance matrices.
It is also remarkable that at each stage the minimum has to be obtained in order
to extend the search at a next stage, which implies the need to maintain a record
of the search in the same way that Viterbi algorithm saves a back pointer to the
previous state on the maximum probability path.
In order to avoid the computation of the edit distances for all possible initial
sequences, we propose a graph-theoretical approach so that the computation of
edit distances may be seen as a search through a basic graph. Such a basic graph
is a directed rooted tree where each non-root vertex (i+j, j), i = 0, 1, , N−M ; j =
1, 2, ,M , indicates a correspondence between the bits xi+j and yj and each edge
indicates either a deletion of the bit xi+j when j = 0, or a possible transition
due to a deletion (D) or a substitution (S), in the remaining cases. In this way,
the computation of edit distances consists in finding the shortest paths through
the graph.
For the description of our improvement, we now define a new weighted di-
rected graph, here called induced graph, where the costs of shortest paths come
directly from the elements of the matrix W . This induced graph is computed
from the basic graph such as follows: if we eliminate vertical edges in the previ-
ous graph by computing the partial transitive closure of every pair of edges of
the form ((i+ j− 2, j− 1), (i+ j− 1, j− 1)) and ((i+ j− 1, j− 1), (i+ j, j)) and
by substituting them by the edge ((i + j − 2, j − 1), (i + j, j)), then we get the
graph that will be called induced graph.
In this graph there are as many vertices as elements in the matrix W , plus
an additional source and an additional sink. On the other hand, the directed
edges in this induced graph are defined from the computation of the edit dis-
tances described in Equation (1), plus additional edges joining the source with
the vertices associated to the first column of W and additional edges joining
the vertices associated to the last column of W with the sink. For instance, the
induced graph corresponding to a constrained edit distance matrix with runs of
decimations of maximum length 1 has (N −M +1) · (2M −N +2) vertices and
2 · (N −M + 1) · (2M −N + 2)−M − 3 edges. Moreover, edges in the induced
graph have different costs depending on the specific pair of sequences X and
Y , and particularly on the coincidences between the corresponding bits of both
sequences, as described in Equation (1). Note that in the induced graph, the
shortest paths between the source and the sink give us the solution of the crypt-
analytic attack through the specification of both decimation and noise sequences
that can be extracted from them.
3 Search of Promising Initial States
The main idea behind the method shown in this Section comes directly from the
association between bits xi+j and edges of the induced graph. Since the calcu-
lation of the minimum edit distance implies the computation of some shortest
path in such a graph, cut sets between the source and the sink in the induced
graph may be useful in order to define a set of conditions for candidate sequences
so that it is possible to establish a minimum threshold edit distance. In this way,
once an intercepted sequence fulfills some of those stated conditions, the cost of
the corresponding cut set can be guaranteed to be minimal for some possible
candidate sequence, what has direct consequences on the costs of the shortest
paths, that is to say, on the edit distances.
In this way, as soon as an intercepted sequence fulfills some specific condition
defined below, and this fact allows the description of a candidate and feasible
initial sequence, we will know that such an initial sequence will provide us with
a useful upper threshold for the edit distance and even in many cases, such a
sequence will be a minimum edit distance sequence.
The specific cut sets that we have used for the numerical results shown in
this work are defined as follows. Each cut set Ci+j , 2 ≤ i+ j ≤ N − 1 contains:
1. The set of all the arcs corresponding to the vertex xi+j .
2. All those edges corresponding to bits xw with w > i+ j whose output vertex
is one of the output vertices of the former set.
For the first model, these cut sets may be characterized by several indepen-
dent conditions on the intercepted sequence Y that may be used to guarantee a
decrease on the edit distances of different candidate sequences X. After having
checked each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of condi-
tions on candidate sequences X are described in terms of a pattern that is made
out of independent bits of X according to the formulas in Equation (2).
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; y1 = y2 = · · · = yj then yj = x1 = x2 = · · · =
xj+N−M
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ; yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj then
yj = xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+N−M
If ∀j :M +1,M +2, . . . , N − 1; yM−N+j = · · · = yM−1 = yM then yM = xj =
xj+1 = · · · = xN
(2)
For the second model, the cut sets may be characterized by different independent
conditions on the intercepted sequence X that may be used to guarantee a
decrease on the edit distances of candidate sequences Y . After having checked
each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on
candidate sequences Y are described in terms of a pattern that is made out of
independent bits of Y according to the formulas in Equation (3).
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; x1 = x2 = · · · = xj+N−M then x1 = y1 = y2 =
· · · = yj
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ;xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+N−M then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j :M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; xj = xj+1 = · · · = xN then xj = yM−N+j =
· · · = yM−1 = yM
(3)
For checking previous equations (2) and (3), it is necessary to determine the
value of N , which depends on k that is the maximum length of possible runs of
decimations. For example, if k = 1, then N = 3M/2, which is the mathematical
expectation of N in such a case.
Note that the checking procedure of hypothesis described with the previous
Equations, applied on the intercepted sequence takes polynomial time as it im-
plies a simple verification of runs. The previous patterns allow one to discover
promising initial states producing sequences with a low edit distance. In fact,
such a pattern provides a good quality threshold for the method that will be
described in the following Section.
4 General Attack
The threshold obtained through the pattern described in the previous Section is
a fundamental ingredient of the general attack described below. The algorithm
here developed also makes use of a new concept, the so-called stop column, which
leads to a considerable saving in the computation of the edit distance matrices.
Indeed, a stop column with respect to a threshold T may be defined as a column
j0 of the edit distance matrix W such that each one of their elements fulfills the
Equation (4).
wi,j0 > T − (N −M − i),∀i (4)
Once a minimum edit distance threshold has been obtained, we may use such
a threshold to stop the computation of any matrix W as soon as a stop column
has been detected. This is due to the fact that the edit distance corresponding
to the candidate initial state will be worse than the threshold. In this simple
way, two new improvements on the original attack may be achieved. On the one
hand, as yet mentioned, the computation of any matrix may be stopped as soon
as a stop column is obtained. On the other hand and thanks to the association
between bits xi+j and edges of the graph, we may define a new anti-pattern on
the initial states of the target LFSR, the so-called IS-anti-pattern. This new
parameter allows us to discard the set of initial states fulfilling such an IS-anti-
pattern when an early stop column has been detected. This is so because once
a stop column has been obtained, it is possible to discard directly all the initial
states whose first bits coincide with those that produce the stop column. In order
to take full advantage of stop columns, it is convenient to have some efficient way
of obtaining a good threshold. That is exactly the effect of the pattern described
in the previous Section.
Since it is possible that the described pattern correspond only to sequences
that may not be produced by the target LFSR, in practice it is convenient to
restrict the pattern to the length of the target LFSR. So, the pattern obtained
from the first formulas of Equations (2) and (3) limited to the length of the
target LFSR is what we call IS-pattern. On the other hand, although sequences
generated through the IS-pattern have minimum edit distance, it is possible
that the corresponding obtained decimation or insertion sequences and noise se-
quences are not consistent with the description of the attacked generator. This
is the reason why the proposed algorithm includes a process of hypothesis re-
laxation, which implies the successive complementation of bits of the IS-pattern
until getting a positive result.
Finally, since the IS-pattern is determined by the runs at the beginning of
the intercepted sequence, if no long run exists at the beginning of the sequence,
initially the algorithm discards the first bits in the intercepted sequence before
a long run, and use those discarded bits to confirm the result of the attack. This
idea is expressed within the algorithm by a parameter H ∈ [0, L], chosen by
the attacker depending on its computational capacity (the greater capacity, the
fewer H).
The full description of the proposed general edit distance attack is as follows.
Algorithm
Input: The intercepted keystream sequence and the feedback polynomial of
the target LFSR of length L.
Output: The initial states of the target LFSR producing sequences with a low
edit distance with the intercepted sequence, and the corresponding decimation
or insertion sequence and noise sequence.
1. Verification of hypothesis on the intercepted sequence described in Equation
(2) or (3).
2. While fewer than H hypothesis are fulfilled, discard the first bit and consider
the resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence.
3. Definition of the IS-pattern according to the first L formulas in Equation (2)
or (3).
4. Initialization of the threshold T = N .
5. For each initial state fulfilling the IS-pattern, which has not been previously
rejected:
(a) Computation of the edit distance matrix, stopping after detecting a stop
column according to threshold T and Equation (4).
(b) Definition of the IS-anti-pattern and rejection of all initial states fulfilling
it.
(c) Updating of the threshold T .
6. For each initial state producing a sequence with minimum edit distance:
(a) Computation of the shortest paths from the graph induced by the edit
distance matrix.
(b) Translation from each shortest path into decimation or insertion se-
quences and noise sequences.
(c) Checking that the obtained decimation or insertion sequences, and noise
sequences are consistent with the attacked generator. Otherwise, updat-
ing of the IS-pattern by complementing one of the bits in the original
IS-pattern.
Note that if the output is not the minimum edit distance sequence, the ob-
tained edit distance can be used as threshold for the stop column method in
order to find such a sequence quickly.
5 Attack on Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators
In this Section a specific implementation of the general attack presented in the
previous Section for the cases of the SG and the ASG is considered.
One of the first questions that have to be taken into account in both cases is
the limitation on the number of consecutive deletions because the longest run of
consecutive deletions in X to get Y is always shorter than the length LS of the
selector register S. This restriction implies that the equation (1) corresponding to
the computation of the edit distance matrix should be modified in the following
way:
wi,1 = Pi(xi+1, y1), i = 0, . . . , LS
w0,j = w0,j−1 + P0(xj , yj), j = 2, . . . ,M
wi,1 =∞, i = LS + 1, . . . , N −M
wi,j = mink=0,...,LS−1{wi−k,j−1+Pk(xi+j , yj)}, i = 1, . . . , N−M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+j , yj) =
{
k if xi+j = yj
k + 1 if xi+j 6= yj k = 0, ..., LS − 1
(5)
Equations (2) and (3) corresponding to the definition of the pattern in the
first and the second model, respectively must be also adapted to the SG and the
ASG, producing the Equations (6) and (7) respectively:
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; y1+j/LS = · · · = yj−1 = yj then yj = xLS(j/LS) =
xLS(j/LS)+1 = · · · = xLS(j/LS)+LS−1
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ; yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj then
yj = xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+LS−1
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; yM−N+j = · · · = yM−(N−j)/LS then yM =
xj = xj+1 = · · · = xmin(j+LS−1,N)
(6)
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1;xLS(j/LS) = xLS(j/LS)+1 = · · · = xLS(j/LS)+LS−1
then xLS(j/LS) = y1+j/LS = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ;xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+LS−1 then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; xj = xj+1 = · · · = xmin(j+LS−1,N) then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yM−(N−j)/LS
(7)
Finally, the process of hypothesis relaxation explained in the last Section
must also be used for the cases of SG and ASG when the minimum obtained
edit distance is greater than N−M since it corresponds to the presence of noise.
6 Simulation Results
From several randomly generated examples, we may deduce a general clas-
sification of inputs into several cases. The best ones correspond to IS-patterns
which directly identify solutions. On the contrary, bad cases are those ‘miss-
ing the event’ cases in which the IS-pattern fails to identify any correct initial
state. Such cases are generally associated with long runs at the beginning of
the sequences Y . Finally, the medium cases are those for which, despite the non
existence of solutions fulfilling the pattern, a good threshold is obtained. Such
cases allow a good percentage of saving in computing thanks to the detection of
many early stop columns.
From the obtained results and the relationship between LA and Seq.pat. we
may deduce that the proposed algorithm produces the solution in O(2LA/2) time
instead of the O(2LA) time corresponding to the exhaustive search that implied
the original attack [13]. Furthermore, it is clear that the worst outputs appear
when the initial results in steps 1 to 4 are not adequate as there are no initial
states fulfilling the IS-pattern. However, even in these cases that require more
computation, it is guaranteed that the solution is always obtained.
Note that as aforementioned, the proposed algorithm not always output the
minimum edit distance sequence. However, since the hypothesis on Y are in-
dependent, the groups of bits in the IS-pattern are also independent and, con-
sequently, the conditions might be considered separately in such way that we
might define in this way a relaxed IS-pattern which might lead to sequences
that fulfill them. In addition, empirical results have shown that intercepted se-
quences Y with short runs at the beginning cause a greater improvement in the
time complexity of the attack. Thus, another way to avoid a bad behavior of the
original algorithm is by choosing sub-sequences from the intercepted sequence
Y that have no too long runs at the beginning, and by applying the algorithm
to each one of these sub-sequences.
7 Conclusions
In this work a new deterministic approach to the cryptanalysis of LFSR-based
stream ciphers has been proposed. In particular, a practical improvement on the
edit distance attack on certain clock-controlled LFSR-based generators has been
proposed, which reduces the computational complexity of the original attack
because it does not require an exhaustive search over all the initial states of the
target LFSR. The main tool used for the optimization of the original attack
was the definition of graphs where optimal paths provide cryptanalytic results
and of cut sets on them that have been used to obtain a useful threshold to cut
the search tree.
An extension of this article, which is being part of a work in progress, takes
advantage of the basic idea of using cut sets to improve edit distance attacks
against generalized clock-controlled LFSR-based generators. In order to do this,
the three edit operations are considered and the resulting cut sets on the corre-
sponding induced graph allow the identification of promising initial states.
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